Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

2-1-2016

Popular Attitudes Towards Markets and Democracy: Russia and
United States Compared 25 Years Later
Maxim Boycko
Robert J. Shiller

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Boycko, Maxim and Shiller, Robert J., "Popular Attitudes Towards Markets and Democracy: Russia and
United States Compared 25 Years Later" (2016). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2474.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2474

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY:
RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES COMPARED 25 YEARS LATER

By
Maxim Boycko and Robert J. Shiller

February 2016

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2030

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.yale.edu/

POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY:
RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES COMPARED 25 YEARS LATER

Maxim Boycko
Robert J. Shiller

The authors wish to thank Steven Fish, Jim Gibson and Luigi Zingales for stimulating discussion. Jim Gibson also helped with access to his
1990 Moscow Oblast survey results and Andrew Brod provided research assistance.

Popular Attitudes toward Markets and Democracy:
Russia and United States Compared 25 Years Later

We repeat a survey we did in the waning days of the Soviet Union (Shiller, Boycko and
Korobov, AER 1991) comparing attitudes towards free markets between Moscow and New
York. Additional survey questions, from Gibson Duch and Tedin (J. Politics 1992) are added to
compare attitudes towards democracy. Two comparisons are made: between countries, and
through time, to explore the existence of international differences in allegiance to democratic
free-market institutions, and the stability of these differences. While we find some differences
in attitudes towards markets across countries and through time, we do not find most of the
differences large or significant. Our evidence does not support a common view that the Russian
personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic.
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Public attitudes toward markets and toward democracy are fundamental to the well-functioning
of an economy and a society. Attitudes toward markets and attitudes toward democracy are
naturally connected: both are about individual freedoms, how they should be allowed, how the
freedoms can be assured, or, on the other hand, how they should be limited.
In 1990, a year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while one of us, Boycko, lived in
Moscow, and while the other, Shiller, lived in New Haven, in the greater New York area, we did
a telephone survey of the general public in the respective cities (with Ukrainian survey expert
Vladimir Korobov) about attitudes toward markets. Questions were about fair prices and income
inequality, resistance to exchange of money, lack of appreciation for incentives, and hostility
toward business, (see Shiller et al (1991)). The questions, as well as questions in our follow-up
survey Shiller et al (1992), were identical as far as the translation between Russian and English
would allow, and as far as our impressions of how the questions would be understood could be.
We designed questions that would reveal the underpinnings of attitudinal differences between the
countries, based on our personal impressions in our respective countries of the significant
underlying differences. Our questions avoided direct use of abstract concepts, like “markets” or
“capitalism”, as we were concerned that these may have subtly different meanings in the two
countries, colored by culture, associations, prevailing senses of politically correct usage, etc.
Instead we asked respondents about their behavior in, or evaluations of, imaginary scenarios that
resemble real life situations that the respondents in both countries were likely familiar with.
In the same year, 1990, political scientists James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin,
(1992) did a telephone survey in Moscow with questions about attitudes toward democracy. We
felt their survey contained some of the same spirit as ours and similar methodology. Although
Gibson et al (1992) did not provide an explicit comparison with US or another developed
democracy, they largely avoided asking directly about “democracy”, “competition among political
parties”, or “strong leader”. 1 Instead, their respondents were mostly asked to evaluate social rules
applied to specific situations or scenarios. The questions probed attitudes to social norms,
freedoms, rights consciousness, tolerance of minority views, support for dissent, etc.
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A good example of this more direct approach to measuring Russian political attitudes is Hale (2011). See Guriev et al 2008 and Treisman
(2011, pp 377-388) for recent surveys of this literature.

In this paper, we report on a new survey that we have done in 2015, twenty-five years after these
1990 surveys. The script for the interviewer had as its first part the identical questions that we
asked in 1990 (then called Questionnaire B), and in the identical order, followed by seven of the
questions asked by Gibson et al, though not an exact ordered sequence of their question scripts.
Since the Gibson et al. survey in 1990 was in Russian only, we did a retranslation of their original
Russian questions into English, making slight improvements in the accuracy of the translation over
the English translation of the questions that were presented in the Gibson et al. (1992) paper. 2
Knowing that answers to questionnaires are influenced by framing, and by the previous
questions asked, we wanted to make the procedure identical through time as much as possible,
which is something we could do for the first part of the interviews. The details of the 1990 surveys
are in Shiller et al. (1991) and Gibson et al. (1992). The 2015 Russian survey, carried out in
Moscow in November 2015 by the Russian survey firm ADAPT, produced 301 responses, 151
from landline and 150 from mobile, while the United States survey, carried out in Greater New
York City November 2015 by Survey Sampling Inc., produced 300 responses, 170 from landline
and 130 from mobile. Additional characteristics of the five surveys are in Table A1 below.

I.

Changes in Russia and in the United States over 25 Years

Since 1990, Russia has experienced tectonic changes in its economic and political system,
largely succeeding in building a market economy, but failing to develop a functioning democracy.
The EBRD transition indicators index for Russia, that tracks progress in market reforms against
standards of industrialized market economies along six dimensions, has increased from an average
of 1.0 in 1990 to 3.3 in 2014 (the index range is from 1.0 to 4.3). The gains in the Polity2 index
for Russia, that measures the level of democracy, were more modest: from 0 in 1990 to 4 in 2014
(the range is from -10 to 10).
A popular interpretation in recent years is that Russians' attitudes have been to blame for the
lack of progress on democracy, that Russians understand the workings and advantages of free
markets, but not of democracy. In 2004, Russian oligarch-turned-dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
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We are grateful to Michael Gronas, professor of Russian language and literature at Dartmouth College, who helped verify the accuracy of
these retranslations.
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while serving his prison term, had the following to say about President Vladimir Putin: he “is
probably neither liberal, nor democratic. But he is still more liberal and democratic than 70 percent
of our country’s population " 3.
While illiberal and non-democratic attitudes are certainly common in Russia, the question is how
frequent they are compared to the same attitudes in developed democracies. Gibson et al (1992)
showed that these frequencies were in fact low in 1990, generally comparable to those observed
in developed countries with functioning democracies. An important objective of our 2015 surveys
was to explore if the frequencies of non-democratic attitudes are still low in Russia and to compare
them directly to United States.
Another recent development in Russia is massive and, admittedly, effective government
propaganda effort 4, which has a substantial anti-Western component. “Western democracy” is
generally portrayed as dysfunctional, amoral, hypocritical, etc., which has likely damaged public
perception of the concept of democracy, and might have affected the fundamental attitudes to it as
well. We believe that in the current, “propaganda-intensive” environment, responses to the
questions in our survey, mostly focused on social rules applied to specific situations, have a better
chance of revealing fundamental public attitudes than the more direct questions about democracy.
In the United States, economic and political changes since 1990 appear less dramatic. In 1990
Ronald Reagan’s free market revolution was still new, but already suffering from concerns that
deregulation had spawned a savings and loan crisis. By 2015, doubts about free markets were
reinforced by the 2008 financial crisis. Doubts can be observed through social movements such as
the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, the surge of concern with inequality as with Piketty
(2014), the expressions of fears of dangers to working people from robotics destroying economic
power of working people, and the enthusiastic reception to socialist Bernie Sanders of 2015.
Changes in the two countries over the 25 year period presented certain challenges for our survey
methodology and data analysis. The proliferation of mobile phones in both countries required us
to get representative samples of the users of the two kinds of telephones. Large shifts in the
composition of the underlying populations of Moscow and New York necessitated additional
attention to control variables. However, probit regressions with controls for age, sex, education
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As quoted in Myers (2015), p 253.
See Pomerantsev (2014) for a lively journalistic account.

level, foreign origin, rural origin, and cell phone confirmed statistical significance of “large”
differences between countries or over time with only a few exceptions.
When presenting our results below we report the frequencies of “anti-market” and “antidemocracy” responses. In calculating these frequencies we omit “No answer” responses from the
denominator. Same-year differences between the two countries that in our probit regressions are
statistically significant at 5% and at 1% are marked by “C” and “CC”, respectively; statistically
significant differences within a country over time (between 1990 and 2015) are marked by “T” (at
5%) and “TT” (at 1%).

II.

Attitudes toward Free Markets

Our original conclusion from the 1990 survey was that attitudes toward markets were
surprisingly similar between Russia and the United States. We find they are generally as similar
in 2015, maybe even more so.
For example, in our 1990 survey we asked a question that referred to demand-induced increases
of prices of flowers on holidays, implicitly alluding to the International Woman’s Day in Russia,
when even in the Soviet times men routinely bought flowers for wives and girlfriends, and to
Mothers’ Day in the U.S.:
B2. “On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually go up. Is it
fair for flowers sellers to raise their prices like this?”
No

M90

NY90

66%

68%T

M15
67%CC

NY15
55%TCC

We see that in both countries people are opposed to this outcome of free markets: higher prices
are unfair. The only change here we observe in 2015 – relatively small in magnitude, but
statistically significant – relates to New York, where tolerance to price hikes have actually
increased, not decreased, as movements like Occupy Wall Street might suggest.
We sharpened the same question by removing any possible cost justification for increased prices,
and still get similar results:
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B11. “A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $1000 each. There is so much
demand for the tables that it cannot meet it fully. The factory decides to raise the price of its tables
by $100, when there was no change in the costs of producing tables. Is this fair?”
No

M90

NY90

66%

70%

M15

NY15

68%C

57%C

(Prices were indexed to inflation in both B11 and B7 below, and presented in local currency.)
A follow-up question asked about the policy implications of these fairness judgements:
B3. “Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, even if it might
produce a shortage of flowers?”
Yes

M90

NY90

M15

54%CC

28%CC

43%CC

NY15
22%CC

Here a significant difference remains between Russians and Americans, although now in both
countries respondents are less supportive of government regulation. 5
Another follow-up question was about whether the factory should have the right to increase
prices:
B12. “Apart from fairness, should the factory have the right to raise the price in this situation?”
No

M90

NY90

43%TT

41%

M15
53%TTCC

NY15
35%CC

In this case we register a statistically significant, even if not large, shift in attitudes in Moscow
in the “anti-market” direction both over time and relative to New York. 6
We also explored perception of speculation as a potential reason for price increases. In 1990,
Russians were less likely than Americans to attribute a price increase in world markets to
speculators’ efforts. Today, these attitudes have effectively reversed across countries: Russians

5
6

The changes over time in both countries, however, are not statistically significant.

Our probit regression reveals that education has stronger effect on responses to B12 than geography: those with education level of “some
college” or higher are 20 percentage points less likely to answer “no” than the lesser educated part of the sample.

are more likely to hold speculators responsible, while Americans are skeptical of speculators’
capabilities.
B6. “If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30%, what do you think is
likely to be to blame? [Responses:] 1. Interventions of some government. 2. Such things as bad
harvest in Brazil or unexpected changes in demand. 3. Speculators’ effort to raise prices.”
M90
3. Speculators’ effort to raise
prices

NY90

32%TTCC

51%TTCC

M15
54%TTCC

NY15
33%TTCC

One of the differences that surprised us in the 1990 survey was that Americans were more
intolerant than Russians of compensated price increases, including a compensated increase in the
aggregate level of prices. Today the level of intolerance is the same in two countries, at about
65%.
B10. “Suppose that economists have come to the conclusion that we could substantially improve
our standard of living in the next year if we would be willing to accept a thirty percent inflation
rate (increase in the prices of goods by 30%). This would mean that our incomes would rise by
more than 30%. Then we could buy more goods at the new higher prices. Would you support such
a proposal?”
M90
No

NY90

53%C

72%C

M15
63%

NY15
65%

Back in 1990 we found some evidence that Russians were, to a certain extent, less willing than
Americans to accept exchange of money as a solution to problems. In 2015, we observe smaller
differences between countries, although they remain statistically significant, as in responses to the
question below:
B7. “You are standing in a long line to buy something. You see that someone comes to the line
and is very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a great hurry and absolutely must
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make this purchase. A person at the front of the line offers to let him take his place in line for $50.
Would you be annoyed at this deal even though it won't cause you to wait any longer?”
M90
Yes

69%TCC

NY90
44%CC

M15

NY15

57%TCC

44%CC

In 1990 we were surprised to find only a small (and not statistically significant) difference
between Russians and Americans in their level of concern about a possible future government
confiscation of savings. Although soon after our survey people’s savings in Russia were wiped out
by the government printing money, this experience apparently had no lasting effect, as evidenced
in responses to the following question:
B8. “How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few years will take
measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have saved a great deal from making use
of their savings? Is it quite likely, possible, unlikely or impossible that the government will do
this?”

“quite likely”+”possible”

M90

NY90

61%

52%

M15
50%

NY15
54%

Still, at around 50%, the level of concern about confiscation of savings remains substantial in
both countries, actually.
Another unexpected result of the 1990 study was Russians’ relative willingness to make large
risky investments in a business of a group of friends. Perhaps due to negative experience or
improved investment opportunities this willingness has declined and there are no intercountry
differences here anymore:
B5. “Suppose that a group of your friends are starting a business that you think is very risky and
could fail but might also make investors in that business rich. Would you be tempted to invest a
substantial portion of your savings in it?”
M90

NY90

M15

NY15

No
59%TT

67%

71%TT

75%

Transition to a market economy improves labor incentives by making consumer goods and
services available at market clearing prices, rather than through queues and other non-price
rationing mechanisms. We see evidence of this in a sharp, 31-percentage point, increase in
Russians’ willingness to work hard to earn more money, as documented below:
B9. “Suppose that for certain reasons you are offered a 10% increase in the duties you perform
at your work place with the following terms: your workweek will be increased by 1/10 (say, you
will work an additional half a day) and your take-home pay will also increase by 10%. If you take
this offer, this has no other effects on your prospects for promotion or relations with co-workers.
Do you consider it attractive to have less free time, but more money, so that you would take this
offer, or would you decide to reject it?”
M90
I will definitely reject the offer

NY90

73%TTCC

51%CC

M15
42%TTCC

NY15
58%CC

Americans willingness to work harder for money has slightly decreased over the period and they
are now behind Russians in this respect 7.
In responses to another work-related question, we document a moderate “anti-market” shift in
Russians’ views of whether it is appropriate to take initiative at work:
ȼ“In your opinion, which of the following statements is closer to the truth? 1) An employee who
works hard and has the best interests of the business at heart can be worth twice as much to his
company as less well-motivated employee. 2) As a rule, an employee should generally do just what
he is told- trying to do much more is likely to do more harm than help. “
M90
2)

NY90

11%T

11%

M15
20%TCC

NY15
10%CC

And today, as 25 years ago, Russians remain more interested than Americans in becoming
wealthy through success in business:

7

In 1990, only 2% of respondents in Moscow worked in private firms, while in 2015 42% did. In New York, the change was in the other
direction: from 53% in 1990 to 43% in 2015.
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B4. “Which of the following achievements would please you more?” [Response choices: 1) You
win fortune without fame: you make enough money through successful business dealings so that
you can live very comfortably for the rest of your life; 2) You win fame without fortune: for
example, you win a medal at the Olympics or you become a respected journalist or scholar.]
M90
2)

35%

NY90
46%

M15

NY15

33%CC

48%CC

As a general summary of these results, while there are differences, we see a basic similarity
across countries and through time. Sometimes Russians have a dimmer view of free market
outcomes and incentives, sometimes the Americans.
III.

Attitudes toward Democracy

In Table 1 below we present frequencies of “anti-democratic” responses to seven questions about
democracy from Gibson et al (1992) in the three subsamples. The “anti-democratic” responses are
“agree” or “completely agree” in questions B13, B14, B15, and B18, but “disagree” or “completely
disagree” in B16, B17, and B19 (we reordered and renumbered Gibson’s questions)
In responses to three out of the seven questions (B13, B14, B15) we document an increase in
anti-democratic attitudes in Moscow between 1990 and 2015 8 and these same attitudes are the only
ones that appear substantially stronger in Moscow than in New York in 2015.
We observe a regrettable increase in Russians’ intolerance of minority views, as evidenced in
responses to B13. But, at 37%, the frequency of this intolerance remains below 50% and not too
far from that of Americans (29%).
In 1990, most Russians used to support the freedom of demonstrations by radical and extremist
groups that may lead to disorder and destruction (question B14), in 2015 they no longer do. But
in 2015 Russians may overreact to the words “radical” and “extremist” that are heavily employed
by government propaganda, with its emphasis on discrediting “color revolutions” in neighboring
countries. Nevertheless, the difference with Americans is large, at 31 percentage points.

8

Strictly speaking, the results of our 2015 survey and those of Gibson et al (1992) are not directly comparable because of differences in survey
methodology (telephone interviews vs. in-home interviews) and geography (Moscow vs. Moscow region). Significance tests reported in the table
below for changes through time in their Moscow questions also do not account for any control variables.

Still, the largest difference with Americans that we found, of 41 percentage points in responses
to question B15, relates to a preference for a society with strict order at the expense of some
freedoms that may bring “destruction to the society”. This preference, at 76% in Moscow today,
is not too different from 69%, recorded by Gibson et al (1992) 25 years ago. 9
The other differences between Russians and Americans in attitudes toward democracy, as
evidenced in responses to questions B16-B19 in Table 1, appear fairly small and unimportant, or
go in the other direction.
Is the glass of Russians’ attitudes to democracy half-full or half-empty? While in several respects
“pro-democracy” attitudes are not as strong in Russia today as 25 years ago and weaker than those
of contemporary Americans, we find strong correlation between our survey results and those of
Gibson et al (1992) who “… discovered far more support for democratic values in Moscow than
[they] anticipated” (p. 360).

IV.

Interpretation of Results

Back in 1990, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the launch of President Yeltsin’s
market reforms, a common view in Russia was that ordinary Russians are “not ready” for the
transition to a market economy, because they do not understand the markets and have different
values. The impact of Shiller et. al. (1991), despite its finding of some interesting attitudinal
differences between Russians and Americans, was to demonstrate that this view was really not
supported by evidence. Today, after 25 years of development of markets in Russia, that old view
sounds almost ridiculous. The new evidence presented in this paper, building on the earlier results
of Gibson et al (1992), again uncovers some differences between Russians and Americans in their
attitudes toward democracy. Yet on balance the evidence does not support a parallel common
view that the Russian personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic. Perhaps at some
point in the future this view will sound ridiculous, too.

9

One caveat that we have about this result is the accuracy of the translation: despite our best efforts to find the proper English equivalent, the
formulation of the alternative to “strict order” in Russian may remain somewhat stronger-worded than in English: «Ʌɭɱɲɟ ɠɢɬɶ ɜ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟ ɫɨ
ɫɬɪɨɝɢɦ ɩɨɪɹɞɤɨɦ, ɱɟɦ ɞɚɬɶ ɥɸɞɹɦ ɬɚɤ ɦɧɨɝɨ ɫɜɨɛɨɞɵ, ɱɬɨ ɨɧɢ ɫɦɨɝɭɬ ɫɬɚɬɶ ɪɚɡɪɭɲɢɬɟɥɹɦɢ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɚ».
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Table 1: “Anti-Democracy” Attitudes in Moscow, 1990 and 2015, and in New York, 2015
M90
B13. Society shouldn't have to put up with people whose
political views are fundamentally different from the views of
majority.
[Agree]
B14. Because demonstrations frequently lead to disorder
and destruction, radical and extremist political groups
should be forbidden to demonstrate.
[Agree]
B15. It is better to live in a society with strict order than
to allow people so much freedom that they can bring
destruction to the society.
[Agree]
B16. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he
should be provided with the same political rights and
defense as anyone else.
[Disagree]
B17. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their
views, can express themselves freely.
[Disagree]
B18. If someone is suspected of high treason or other
serious crimes he may be put to prison without trial.
[Agree]
B19. The press should be protected by the law from
persecution by the government.
[Disagree]

M15

NY15

22%TT

37%TTC

29%C

37%TT

59%TTCC

29%CC

69%T

76%TCC

36%CC

2%

3%CC

7%CC

6%

8%

4%

18%

15%

19%

2%TT

20%TTC

27%C

Note: The nature of “anti-democratic” response is shown in square brackets. Questions are
from Gibson et al. (1992), retranslated from the original Russian. Results are shown from their
Moscow survey 1990 and our Moscow and New York surveys in 2015. Statistical significance of
difference through time for Moscow in this table are simple tests for equality of sample
proportions, omitting control variables.
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Appendix
1. U.S. Questionnaire, 2015
2. Russia Questionnaire, 2015
3. Table A1 : Characteristics of the Five Surveys: Moscow, 1990 and 2015; Moscow
Oblast, 1990; New York, 1990 and 2015.

Introduction:

Hi my name is___ I am calling on behalf of Cowles Foundation for Research on Economics at
Yale University. We are conducting a survey of public opinion of residents of the greater New
York City area. Our interview touches on attitude to economic problems. We are not selling
anything and your responses are strictly confidential and anonymous. Is this a good time to
participate?

Agent note: terminate business phone numbers and dispose them accordingly in the sample.

QS1. Are you at least 18 years old?

1. Yes- continue to QB1
2. No- proceed to QS1_1
Qs1_1. Is there any other member in your household who is at least 18 years old?

1. Yes- loop back intro
2. No- callback
ȼ,Q\RXURSLQLRQZKLFKRIWKHIROORZLQJVWDWHPHQWVLVFORVHUWRWKHWUXWK"
1. An employee who works hard and has the best interests of the business at heart can be

worth twice as much to his company as less well-motivated employee.
2. As a rule, an employee should generally do just what he is told- trying to do much more
is likely to do more harm than help.
3. No answer
B2. On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually go up. Is it fair
for flowers sellers to raise their prices like this?
1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer
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B3. Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, even if it might
produce a shortage of flowers?
1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer

B4. Which of the following achievements would please you more?
1. You win fortune without fame: you make enough money through successful business

dealing so that you can live very comfortably for the rest of your life.
2. You win fame without fortune: for example you win a medal at the Olympics or you
become a respected journalist or scholar.
3. No answer
B5. Suppose that a group of your friends are starting a business that you think is very risky and
could fail but might also make investors in that business rich. Would you be tempted to invest a
substantial portion of your savings in it?
1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer

B6. If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30%, what do you think is
likely to be to blame?
1. Interventions of some government.
2. Such things as bad harvest in Brazil or unexpected changes in demand.
3. Speculators’ effort to raise prices
4. No answer

B7. You are standing in a long line to buy something. You see that someone comes to the line
and is very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a great hurry and absolutely must
make this purchase. A person at the front of the line offers to let him take his place in line for $50.
Would you be annoyed at this deal even though it won’t cause you to wait any longer?
1. Yes
2. No

3. No answer

B8. How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few years will take
measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have saved a great deal from making use
of their savings? Is it quite likely, possible, unlikely or impossible that the government will do
this?
1. Quite likely
2. Possible
3. Unlikely
4. Impossible
5. No answer

B9. Suppose that for certain reasons you are offered a 10% increase in the duties you perform at
your work place with the following terms: your workweek will be increased by 1/10 (say, you will
work an additional half a day) and your take-home pay will also increase by 10%. If you take this
offer, this has no other effects on your prospects for promotion or relations with co-workers. Do
you consider it attractive to have less free time, but more money, so that you would take this offer,
or would you decide to reject it?
1. I will definitely reject the offer.
2. I will be more or less indifferent
3. I will definitely accept the offer
4. No answer

B10. Suppose that economists have come to the conclusion that we could substantially improve
our standard of living in the next year if we would be willing to accept a thirty percent inflation
rate (increase in the prices of goods by 30%). This would mean that our incomes would rise by
more than 30%. Then we could buy more goods at the new higher prices. Would you support such
a proposal?
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1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer

B11. A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $1000 each. There is so much
demand for the tables that it cannot meet it fully. The factory decides to raise the price of its tables
by $100, when there was no change in the costs of producing tables. Is this fair?
1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer

B12. Apart from fairness, should the factory have the right to raise the price in this situation?
1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer

Now I would like to read to you several statements and to ask if you completely agree, agree,
disagree, or completely disagree with each of them.
B13. Society shouldn’t have to put up with people whose political views are fundamentally
different from the views of majority.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know

B14. Because demonstrations frequently lead to disorder and destruction, radical and extremist
political groups should be forbidden to demonstrate.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know

B15. It is better to live in a society with strict order than to allow people so much freedom that
they can bring destruction to the society.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know

B16. No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, he should be provided with the same
political rights and defense as anyone else.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know

B17. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express themselves freely.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know

20

B18. If someone is suspected of high treason or other serious crimes he may be put to prison
without trial.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know
B19. The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the government.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Undecided
4. Disagree
5. Completely Disagree
6. Don’t know

Now I just have a few background questions to ask you.

Q21. What is your level of education?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Did not finish high school
Finished high school
Finished high school with special training (e.g. trade school)
Some college
Finished college
Finished graduate school
Don’t Know / Refused

Q22. Which of the following best describes your job?

1. Student
2. Employed
3. Unemployed

4. Homemaker
5. Retired
6. Don’t Know / Refused
Prognote: Ask Q23 only if Q22=2
Q23. Do you work in the government or in a business?

1. Government
2. Business
3. Don’t know / refused
Q24. What is your age?

____ in years; accept codes 18-98 ; code 99 for Don’t Know / Refused

Q25. Did you grow up in the greater New York City Area?

1. Yes- skip to Q28
2. No- ask Q26
3. Don’t Know / Refused- ask Q26
Q26. If not, did you come here:

1.
2.
3.
4.

From another city?
From a rural area?
From another country?
Don’t Know / Refused

Q27. Record gender- DO NOT ASK. By Observation

1. Male
2. Female
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Q28. Are you?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Don’t Know / Refused

Q29. DO NOT ASK. By Observation.
Did the respondent have a foreign (not USA) accent?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t Know

Those are all the questions we have for you. Thank you for your time!

Ⱦɨɛɪɵɣ ɞɟɧɶ ɜɟɱɟɪ  ȼɚɦ ɡɜɨɧɹɬ ɢɡ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɬɟɥɶɫɤɨɣ ɤɨɦɩɚɧɢɢ Ⱥɞɟɩɬ Ɇɵ
ɩɪɨɜɨɞɢɦɨɩɪɨɫɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨɦɧɟɧɢɹɠɢɬɟɥɟɣɆɨɫɤɜɵ
Ɇɟɧɹɡɨɜɭɬ
ɋɧɚɱɚɥɚɹɯɨɬɟɥɛɵɩɪɨɜɟɪɢɬɶɩɪɚɜɢɥɶɧɨɥɢɹɧɚɛɪɚɥ ɚ ɧɨɦɟɪɗɬɨɧɨɦɟɪ
?

ȼɧɢɦɚɧɢɟ ɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɢɣ ɞɚɥɟɟ ɬɟɤɫɬ ɬɨɥɶɤɨ ɞɥɹ ɝɨɪɨɞɫɤɢɯ ɥɢɧɢɣ  ɉɪɢ ɡɜɨɧɤɟ ɧɚ
ɦɨɛɢɥɶɧɵɣɬɟɥɟɮɨɧɩɟɪɟɯɨɞɢɢɬɟɫɪɚɡɭɤɨɜɬɨɪɨɣɫɬɪɚɧɢɰɟɚɧɤɟɬɵ
____________________________________________________________________________
_________
ȼɚɲɧɨɦɟɪɬɟɥɟɮɨɧɚɛɵɥɜɵɛɪɚɧɫɥɭɱɚɣɧɵɦɨɛɪɚɡɨɦɉɨɷɬɨɦɭɹ ɧɟɡɧɚɸɞɨɦɚɲɧɢɣ
ɷɬɨɬɟɥɟɮɨɧɢɥɢɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɹ"
ȿɫɥɢ

ɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɹ

ɬɨ

ɤɨɧɟɰ

ɤɨɧɬɚɤɬɚ

ɂɡɜɢɧɢɬɟɦɧɟɧɭɠɧɵɬɨɥɶɤɨɞɨɦɚɲɧɢɟɬɟɥɟɮɨɧɵ
Ʉɚɤ ɹ ɭɠɟ ɫɤɚɡɚɥ ɦɵ ɩɪɨɜɨɞɢɦ ɨɩɪɨɫ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ ɦɧɟɧɢɹ ɠɢɬɟɥɟɣ Ɇɨɫɤɜɵ
ɇɚɲɟɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɤɚɫɚɟɬɫɹɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹɤɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɦɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɚɦ
ȿɫɥɢɜɵɧɟɜɨɡɪɚɠɚɟɬɟɹɯɨɬɟɥɛɵɨɩɪɨɫɢɬɶɤɨɝɨ-ɧɢɛɭɞɶɢɡɜɚɲɟɣɫɟɦɶɢɇɨ ɞɥɹ
ɬɨɝɨ ɱɬɨɛɵ ɜɵɛɪɚɬɶ ɫ ɤɟɦ ɢɦɟɧɧɨ ɦɧɟ ɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨ ɡɧɚɬɶ ɫɤɨɥɶɤɨ ɜɫɟɝɨ ɥɸɞɟɣ
ɫɬɚɪɲɟɥɟɬɠɢɜɟɬɫɜɚɦɢ"
ɢɛɨɥɟɟ
ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɟɪɭɫɦɤɚɪɬɨɱɤɭɨɬɛɨɪɚɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɚ
Ɍɨɝɞɚɦɧɟɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨɩɨɛɟɫɟɞɨɜɚɬɶɫ

ɩɨɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɭ

Ɉɧ ɚ ɫɟɣɱɚɫɞɨɦɚ"
Ⱦɚ---> əɦɨɝɛɵɩɨɛɟɫɟɞɨɜɚɬɶɫɧɢɦ ɧɟɣ "
ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɟɪɭɟɫɥɢ³ɞɚ´- ɩɟɪɟɯɨɞɢɬɟɤɬɟɤɫɬɭɚɧɤɟɬɵ
ɇɟɬ---> ɤɨɝɞɚɦɧɟɥɭɱɲɟɜɫɟɝɨɩɟɪɟɡɜɨɧɢɬɶ?
ɞɟɧɶ

ɱɚɫ

ɦɢɧ

ɞɟɧɶ

ɱɚɫ

ɦɢɧ

ɞɟɧɶ

ɱɚɫ

ɦɢɧ

Ȼɨɥɶɲɨɟ ɫɩɚɫɢɛɨ ȿɫɥɢ ɭ ɜɚɫ ɜɨɡɧɢɤɧɭɬ ɤɚɤɢɟ-ɥɢɛɨ ɜɨɩɪɨɫɵ ɩɟɪɟɡɜɨɧɢɬɟ ɦɧɟ ɩɨ
ɬɟɥɟɮɨɧɭ

.
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ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɟɪɭɩɪɢɩɨɜɬɨɪɧɨɦɡɜɨɧɤɟɭɫɬɚɧɚɜɥɢɜɚɣɬɟɤɨɧɬɚɤɬɫɧɭɠɧɵɦɱɥɟɧɨɦɫɟɦɶɢɢ
ɩɟɪɟɯɨɞɢɬɟɤɬɟɤɫɬɭɚɧɤɟɬɵ
ɈɉɊɈɋɇȺɌȿɆɍȼɈɋɉɊɂəɌɂȿɊɕɇɈɑɇɕɏɆȿɏȺɇɂɁɆɈȼ
ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɟɪɭ ɩɪɨɱɢɬɚɣɬɟ ɫɥɨɜɨ ɜ ɫɥɨɜɨ ɬɟɤɫɬ ɧɚɩɟɱɚɬɚɧɧɵɣ ɠɢɪɧɵɦ ɲɪɢɮɬɨɦ ɢ
ɤɥɚɫɫɢɮɢɰɢɪɭɣɬɟ ɨɬɜɟɬɵ ɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɚ ɩɨ ɫɜɨɟɦɭ ɭɫɦɨɬɪɟɧɢɸ ɇɟ ɞɚɜɚɣɬɟ ɧɢɤɚɤɢɯ
ɩɨɹɫɧɟɧɢɣɤɜɨɩɪɨɫɚɦȿɫɥɢɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɧɟɩɨɧɢɦɚɟɬɜɨɩɪɨɫɩɪɨɱɢɬɚɣɬɟɟɝɨɟɳɟɪɚɡɢɥɢ
ɤɥɚɫɫɢɮɢɰɢɪɭɣɬɟɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɤɚɤ©ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶª
Ɂɞɪɚɜɫɬɜɭɣɬɟ ɹ ɩɪɨɜɨɠɭ ɨɩɪɨɫ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ ɦɧɟɧɢɹ ɞɥɹ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɬɟɥɶɫɤɨɣ
ɤɨɦɩɚɧɢɢȺɞɟɩɬȼɚɲɧɨɦɟɪɬɟɥɟɮɨɧɚɛɵɥɜɵɛɪɚɧɫɥɭɱɚɣɧɵɦɨɛɪɚɡɨɦəɯɨɬɟɥɛɵ
ɡɚɞɚɬɶɜɚɦɧɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɜɨɩɪɨɫɨɜɨɜɚɲɢɯɜɡɝɥɹɞɚɯɧɚɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɭɇɚɲɨɩɪɨɫɩɪɟɫɥɟɞɭɟɬ
ɱɢɫɬɨɧɚɭɱɧɵɟɰɟɥɢɢɦɵɝɚɪɚɧɬɢɪɭɟɦɚɧɨɧɢɦɧɨɫɬɶɜɚɲɢɯɨɬɜɟɬɨɜəɡɚɣɦɭɧɟɛɨɥɟɟ
ɞɟɫɹɬɢɦɢɧɭɬɜɚɲɟɝɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɢ
ȼɄɚɤɜɵɫɱɢɬɚɟɬɟɤɚɤɨɟɢɡɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɢɯɭɬɜɟɪɠɞɟɧɢɣɛɥɢɠɟɤɢɫɬɢɧɟ
1. ɪɚɛɨɬɧɢɤ ɤɨɬɨɪɵɣ ɭɫɟɪɞɧɨ ɬɪɭɞɢɬɫɹ ɢ ɩɪɢɧɢɦɚɟɬ ɛɥɢɡɤɨ ɤ ɫɟɪɞɰɭ ɢɧɬɟɪɟɫɵ
ɞɟɥɚɦɨɠɟɬɛɵɬɶɜɞɜɚɪɚɡɚɛɨɥɟɟɰɟɧɧɵɦɞɥɹɫɜɨɟɣɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢɱɟɦɦɟɧɟɟ
ɭɫɟɪɞɧɵɣɪɚɛɨɬɧɢɤ
2. ɤɚɤ ɩɪɚɜɢɥɨ ɪɚɛɨɬɧɢɤ ɞɨɥɠɟɧ ɞɟɥɚɬɶ ɬɨɥɶɤɨ ɬɨ ɱɬɨ ɟɦɭ ɜɟɥɹɬ - ɟɫɥɢ ɨɧ
ɫɬɚɪɚɟɬɫɹɫɞɟɥɚɬɶɧɚɦɧɨɝɨɛɨɥɶɲɟɬɨɷɬɨɫɤɨɪɟɟɩɪɢɧɟɫɟɬɜɪɟɞɱɟɦɩɨɥɶɡɭ
3. ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
ȼ ɇɚ ɩɪɚɡɞɧɢɤɢ ɤɨɝɞɚ ɫɩɪɨɫ ɧɚ ɰɜɟɬɵ ɨɫɨɛɟɧɧɨ ɜɟɥɢɤ ɰɟɧɵ ɧɚ ɧɢɯ ɨɛɵɱɧɨ
ɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɚɸɬɋɩɪɚɜɟɞɥɢɜɨɥɢɱɬɨɩɪɨɞɚɜɰɵɰɜɟɬɨɜɩɨɞɧɢɦɚɸɬɰɟɧɵ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼȾɨɥɠɧɨɥɢɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɨɜɜɨɞɢɬɶɨɝɪɚɧɢɱɟɧɢɹɧɚɪɨɫɬɰɟɧɧɚɰɜɟɬɵɞɚɠɟɟɫɥɢɜ
ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɟɬɚɤɢɯɨɝɪɚɧɢɱɟɧɢɣɦɨɠɟɬɜɨɡɧɢɤɚɬɶɞɟɮɢɰɢɬɰɜɟɬɨɜ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ

ȼ Ʉɚɤɨɟ ɢɡ ɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɢɯ ɠɢɡɧɟɧɧɵɯ ɞɨɫɬɢɠɟɧɢɣ ɩɪɢɧɟɫɥɨ ɛɵ ɜɚɦ ɛɨɥɶɲɟ
ɭɞɨɜɥɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɢɹ
1. ɜɵ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɬɟɫɶ ɛɨɝɚɬɵɦ ɧɨ ɧɟ ɡɧɚɦɟɧɢɬɵɦ ɜ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɟ ɭɞɚɱɧɵɯ ɞɟɥɨɜɵɯ
ɨɩɟɪɚɰɢɣ ɜɵ ɡɚɪɚɛɨɬɚɥɢ ɞɨɫɬɚɬɨɱɧɨ ɞɟɧɟɝ ɱɬɨɛɵ ɤɨɦɮɨɪɬɚɛɟɥɶɧɨ ɩɪɨɜɟɫɬɢ
ɜɫɸɩɨɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɭɸɠɢɡɧɶ
2. ɜɵ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɬɟɫɶ ɡɧɚɦɟɧɢɬɵɦ ɧɨ ɧɟ ɛɨɝɚɬɵɦ ɤ ɩɪɢɦɟɪɭ ɜɵ ɡɚɜɨɟɜɵɜɚɟɬɟ
ɦɟɞɚɥɶɧɚɨɥɢɦɩɢɣɫɤɢɯɢɝɪɚɯɢɥɢɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɬɟɫɶɭɜɚɠɚɟɦɵɦɠɭɪɧɚɥɢɫɬɨɦɢɥɢ
ɭɱɟɧɵɦ
3. ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
ȼ ɉɪɟɞɩɨɥɨɠɢɦ ɱɬɨ ɝɪɭɩɩɚ ɜɚɲɢɯ ɞɪɭɡɟɣ ɨɬɤɪɵɜɚɟɬ ɞɟɥɨɜɨɟ ɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟ
ɤɨɬɨɪɨɟ ɫ ɜɚɲɟɣ ɬɨɱɤɢ ɡɪɟɧɢɹ ɜɟɫɶɦɚɪɢɫɤɨɜɚɧɧɨɢɦɨɠɟɬɩɪɨɜɚɥɢɬɶɫɹɧɨɦɨɠɟɬ
ɬɚɤɠɟ ɫɞɟɥɚɬɶ ɛɨɝɚɬɵɦɢ ɬɟɯ ɤɬɨ ɜɥɨɠɢɬ ɜ ɧɟɝɨ ɞɟɧɶɝɢ ɋɨɱɥɢ ɛɵ ɜɵ ɡɚɦɚɧɱɢɜɵɦ
ɜɥɨɠɢɬɶɜɬɚɤɨɟɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟɡɧɚɱɢɬɟɥɶɧɭɸɱɚɫɬɶɫɜɨɢɯɫɛɟɪɟɠɟɧɢɣ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼȿɫɥɢɰɟɧɚɧɚɤɨɮɟɧɚɦɢɪɨɜɨɦɪɵɧɤɟɧɟɨɠɢɞɚɧɧɨɩɨɞɧɢɦɚɟɬɫɹɧɚɤɚɤɜɵ
ɞɭɦɚɟɬɟɱɬɨɫɤɨɪɟɟɜɫɟɝɨɫɬɨɢɬɡɚɷɬɢɦ"
1. ɰɟɥɟɧɚɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɧɵɟɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɹɤɚɤɨɝɨ-ɧɢɛɭɞɶɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ
2. ɬɚɤɢɟ ɩɪɢɱɢɧɵ ɤɚɤ ɧɟɭɪɨɠɚɣ ɜ Ȼɪɚɡɢɥɢɢ ɢɥɢ ɧɟɩɪɟɞɜɢɞɟɧɧɨɟ ɢɡɦɟɧɟɧɢɟ
ɫɩɪɨɫɚ
3. ɫɬɪɟɦɥɟɧɢɟɫɩɟɤɭɥɹɧɬɨɜɩɨɜɵɫɢɬɶɰɟɧɵ
4. ɧɟɡɧɚɸ
ȼȼɵɫɬɨɢɬɟɜɞɥɢɧɧɨɣɨɱɟɪɟɞɢɡɚɤɚɤɨɣ-ɧɢɛɭɞɶɩɨɤɭɩɤɨɣȼɵɜɢɞɢɬɟɤɚɤɤɬɨ-ɬɨ
ɩɨɞɯɨɞɢɬɤɨɱɟɪɟɞɢɢɨɱɟɧɶɪɚɫɫɬɪɚɢɜɚɟɬɫɹɱɬɨɨɱɟɪɟɞɶɬɚɤɚɹɞɥɢɧɧɚɹɚɨɧɫɩɟɲɢɬ
ɢ ɟɦɭ ɫɨɜɟɪɲɟɧɧɨɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨɤɭɩɢɬɶ ɷɬɭ ɜɟɳɶ Ɉɞɢɧ ɢɡ ɫɬɨɹɳɢɯ ɜɧɚɱɚɥɟ ɨɱɟɪɟɞɢ
ɥɸɞɟɣ ɩɪɟɞɥɚɝɚɟɦ ɟɦɭ ɭɫɬɭɩɢɬɶ ɫɜɨɟ ɦɟɫɬɨ ɡɚ  ɬɵɫɹɱɢ ɪɭɛɥɟɣ ȼɵɡɨɜɟɬ ɥɢ ɭ ɜɚɫ
ɪɚɡɞɪɚɠɟɧɢɟɬɚɤɚɹɫɞɟɥɤɚɞɚɠɟɟɫɥɢɢɡ-ɡɚɷɬɨɝɨɜɚɦɧɟɩɪɢɞɟɬɫɹɞɨɥɶɲɟɠɞɚɬɶ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼ ɇɚɫɤɨɥɶɤɨ ɜɟɪɨɹɬɧɨ ɫ ɜɚɲɟɣ ɬɨɱɤɢ ɡɪɟɧɢɹ ɱɬɨ ɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɨ ɜ ɛɥɢɠɚɣɲɢɟ
ɧɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨ ɥɟɬ ɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɦɟɬ ɤɚɤɢɟ-ɧɢɛɭɞɶ ɦɟɪɵ ɱɬɨɛɵ ɬɚɤ ɢɥɢ ɢɧɚɱɟ ɧɟ ɞɚɬɶ
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ɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɫɬɢɬɟɦɤɬɨɧɚɤɨɩɢɥɛɨɥɶɲɢɟɫɛɟɪɟɠɟɧɢɹɜɨɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɬɶɫɹɢɦɢ"ɋɱɢɬɚɟɬɟ
ɥɢɜɵɱɬɨɷɬɨɜɟɫɶɦɚɜɟɪɨɹɬɧɨɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɦɚɥɨɜɟɪɨɹɬɧɨɢɥɢɧɟɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨ"
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

ɜɟɫɶɦɚɜɟɪɨɹɬɧɨ
ɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨ
ɦɚɥɨɜɟɪɨɹɬɧɨ
ɧɟɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨ
ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ

ȼɉɪɟɞɩɨɥɨɠɢɦɱɬɨɩɨɧɟɤɨɬɨɪɵɦɩɪɢɱɢɧɚɦɜɚɦɩɪɟɞɥɚɝɚɸɬɭɜɟɥɢɱɢɬɶɧɚ
ɜɚɲɢ ɧɟɩɨɫɪɟɞɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɟ ɨɛɹɡɚɧɧɨɫɬɢ ɧɚ ɪɚɛɨɬɟ ɧɚ ɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɢɯ ɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɯ
ɉɪɨɞɨɥɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ ɜɚɲɟɣ ɪɚɛɨɱɟɣ ɧɟɞɟɥɢ ɜɨɡɪɚɫɬɟɬ ɧɚ  ɧɚɩɪɢɦɟɪ ɜɵ ɛɭɞɟɬ
ɪɚɛɨɬɚɬɶ ɞɨɩɨɥɧɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ ɩɨɥɞɧɹ ɜ ɧɟɞɟɥɸ  ɨɞɧɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨ ɜɚɲɚ ɡɚɪɩɥɚɬɚ ɬɚɤɠɟ
ɩɨɜɵɲɚɟɬɫɹ ɧɚ  ȿɫɥɢ ɜɵ ɩɪɢɦɟɬɟ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɟ ɷɬɨ ɧɢɤɚɤ ɧɟ ɨɬɪɚɡɢɬɶɫɹ ɧɚ
ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɚɯɜɚɲɟɝɨɫɥɭɠɟɛɧɨɝɨɪɨɫɬɚɢɧɚɜɚɲɢɯɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹɯɫɤɨɥɥɟɝɚɦɢɋɨɱɬɟɬɟ
ɥɢɜɵɡɚɦɚɧɱɢɜɵɦɢɦɟɬɶɦɟɧɶɲɟɫɜɨɛɨɞɧɨɝɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɢɧɨɛɨɥɶɲɟɞɟɧɟɝɢɩɪɢɦɟɬɟɷɬɨ
ɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɟɢɥɢɪɟɲɢɬɟɨɬɤɚɡɚɬɶɫɹɨɬɧɟɝɨ"
1.
2.
3.
4.

ɹɧɚɜɟɪɧɹɤɚɨɬɤɚɠɭɫɶɨɬɬɚɤɨɝɨɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɹ
ɦɧɟɛɭɞɟɬɛɨɥɟɟɢɥɢɦɟɧɟɟɜɫɟ ɪɚɜɧɨ
ɹɧɚɜɟɪɧɹɤɚɩɪɢɦɭɬɚɤɨɟɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɟ
ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ

ȼɉɪɟɞɩɨɥɨɠɢɦɱɬɨɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɫɬɵɩɪɢɲɥɢɤɜɵɜɨɞɭɱɬɨɦɵɫɦɨɠɟɦɜɛɭɞɭɳɟɦ
ɝɨɞɭ

ɡɧɚɱɢɬɟɥɶɧɨ ɩɨɜɵɫɢɬɶ

ɧɚɲ

ɭɪɨɜɟɧɶ

ɠɢɡɧɢ

ɟɫɥɢ

ɫɨɝɥɚɫɢɦɫɹ

ɧɚ

ɬɪɢɞɰɚɬɢɩɪɨɰɟɧɬɧɭɸɢɧɮɥɹɰɢɸ ɩɨɜɵɲɟɧɢɟɰɟɧɚɧɚ ɗɬɨɨɡɧɚɱɚɟɬɱɬɨɧɚɲɢ
ɞɨɯɨɞɵɞɨɥɠɧɵɛɭɞɭɬɜɵɪɚɫɬɢɛɨɥɟɟɱɟɦɧɚɌɨɝɞɚɦɵɫɦɨɠɟɦɤɭɩɢɬɶɛɨɥɶɲɟ
ɬɨɜɚɪɨɜɩɪɢɧɨɜɵɯɛɨɥɟɟɜɵɫɨɤɢɯɰɟɧɚɯɉɨɞɞɟɪɠɚɥɢɛɵɜɵɬɚɤɨɟɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɟ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼɇɟɛɨɥɶɲɨɟɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟɩɪɨɢɡɜɨɞɢɬɤɭɯɨɧɧɵɟɫɬɨɥɵɢɩɪɨɞɚɟɬɢɯɩɨɬɵɫɹɱ
ɪɭɛɥɟɣ ɡɚ ɲɬɭɤɭ ɋɩɪɨɫ ɧɚ ɫɬɨɥɵ ɧɚɫɬɨɥɶɤɨ ɜɟɥɢɤ ɱɬɨ ɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟ ɧɟ ɦɨɠɟɬ ɟɝɨ
ɩɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸ ɭɞɨɜɥɟɬɜɨɪɢɬɶ ɉɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟ ɪɟɲɚɟɬ ɩɨɞɧɹɬɶ ɰɟɧɵ ɧɚ  ɬɵɫɹɱɢ ɪɭɛɥɟɣ
ɯɨɬɹɟɝɨɡɚɬɪɚɬɵɧɚɩɪɨɢɡɜɨɞɫɬɜɨɧɟɢɡɦɟɧɢɥɢɫɶɋɩɪɚɜɟɞɥɢɜɨɥɢɷɬɨ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ

3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶ ɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼ ȿɫɥɢ ɨɬɜɥɟɱɶɫɹ ɨɬ ɫɩɪɚɜɟɞɥɢɜɨɫɬɢ ɞɨɥɠɧɨ ɥɢ ɩɪɟɞɩɪɢɹɬɢɟ ɢɦɟɬɶ ɩɪɚɜɨ
ɩɨɞɧɹɬɶɰɟɧɵɜɬɚɤɨɣɫɢɬɭɚɰɢɢ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
Ɍɟɩɟɪɶ ɹɩɪɨɱɬɭȼɚɦɧɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɪɚɡɥɢɱɧɵɯɜɵɫɤɚɡɵɜɚɧɢɣɉɨɠɚɥɭɣɫɬɚɫɤɚɠɢɬɟ
ȼɵɩɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɧɵɫɨɝɥɚɫɧɵɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɧɵɢɥɢɫɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɧɵɫɤɚɠɞɵɦɢɡ
ɧɢɯ"
ȼɈɛɳɟɫɬɜɨɧɟɞɨɥɠɧɨɦɢɪɢɬɶɫɹɫɬɟɦɢɱɶɢɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɜɡɝɥɹɞɵɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨ
ɨɬɥɢɱɚɸɬɫɹɨɬɜɡɝɥɹɞɨɜɛɨɥɶɲɢɧɫɬɜɚ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
2. ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
3. Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
4. ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
5. ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
6. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼ14. ɉɨɫɤɨɥɶɤɭ ɞɟɦɨɧɫɬɪɚɰɢɢ ɱɚɫɬɨ ɩɪɢɜɨɞɹɬ ɤ ɛɟɫɩɨɪɹɞɤɚɦ ɢ ɪɚɡɪɭɲɟɧɢɹɦ
ɪɚɞɢɤɚɥɶɧɵɦ ɢ ɷɤɫɬɪɟɦɢɫɬɫɤɢɦ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɦ ɝɪɭɩɩɚɦ ɞɨɥɠɧɨ ɛɵɬɶ ɡɚɩɪɟɳɟɧɨ
ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɢɟɞɟɦɨɧɫɬɪɚɰɢɢ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
2. ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
3. Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
4. ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
5. ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
6. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼ Ʌɭɱɲɟ ɠɢɬɶ ɜ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟ ɫɨ ɫɬɪɨɝɢɦ ɩɨɪɹɞɤɨɦ ɱɟɦ ɞɚɬɶ ɥɸɞɹɦ ɬɚɤ ɦɧɨɝɨ
ɫɜɨɛɨɞɵɱɬɨɨɧɢɫɦɨɝɭɬɫɬɚɬɶɪɚɡɪɭɲɢɬɟɥɹɦɢɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɚ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
2. ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
3. Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
4. ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
5. ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
6. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼɊɚɜɧɵɟɸɪɢɞɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɩɪɚɜɚɢɝɚɪɚɧɬɢɢɡɚɳɢɬɵɞɨɥɠɧɵɛɵɬɶɩɪɟɞɨɫɬɚɜɥɟɧɵ
ɥɸɛɨɦɭɱɟɥɨɜɟɤɭɧɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɨɬɟɝɨɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɭɛɟɠɞɟɧɢɣ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
28

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ

ȼɇɭɠɧɨɱɬɨɛɵɜɫɟɧɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɨɬɢɯɜɡɝɥɹɞɨɜɦɨɝɥɢɜɵɫɤɚɡɵɜɚɬɶɫɹɫɜɨɛɨɞɧɨ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
2. ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
3. Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
4. ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
5. ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
6. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
ȼȿɫɥɢɤɬɨ-ɬɨɩɨɞɨɡɪɟɜɚɟɬɫɹɜɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣɢɡɦɟɧɟɢɥɢɜɞɪɭɝɢɯɫɟɪɶɟɡɧɵɯ
ɩɪɟɫɬɭɩɥɟɧɢɹɯɨɧɦɨɠɟɬɛɵɬɶɩɨɫɚɠɟɧɜɬɸɪɶɦɭɛɟɡɫɭɞɚ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
2. ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
3. Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
4. ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
5. ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
6. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
B19. ɉɪɟɫɫɚɞɨɥɠɧɚɛɵɬɶɡɚɳɢɳɟɧɚɡɚɤɨɧɨɦɨɬɩɪɟɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɣɜɥɚɫɬɟɣ
1. ɉɨɥɧɨɫɬɶɸɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
2. ɋɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
3. Ʉɨɥɟɛɥɸɫɶ
4. ɇɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
5. ɋɨɜɫɟɦɧɟɫɨɝɥɚɫɟɧ
6. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ

Ɍɟɩɟɪɶɟɫɥɢɦɨɠɧɨɧɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨɜɨɩɪɨɫɨɜɨɜɚɫɫɚɦɢɯ
21. ȼɚɲɭɪɨɜɟɧɶɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

ɧɟɡɚɤɨɧɱɟɧɧɨɟɫɪɟɞɧɟɟ
ɫɪɟɞɧɟɟ
ɫɪɟɞɧɟɟɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɟ
ɧɟɡɚɤɨɧɱɟɧɧɨɟɜɵɫɲɟɟ
ɜɵɫɲɟɟ
ɨɤɨɧɱɢɥɚɫɩɢɪɚɧɬɭɪɭ
ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ

22. ȼɚɲɟɫɨɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɟɩɨɥɨɠɟɧɢɟ"
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ɍɱɚɳɢɣɫɹɫɬɭɞɟɧɬ
ɪɚɛɨɱɢɣɢɥɢɫɥɭɠɚɳɢɣ
ɛɟɡɪɚɛɨɬɧɵɣ
ɡɚɧɢɦɚɸɫɶɞɨɦɚɲɧɢɦɯɨɡɹɣɫɬɜɨɦ
ɩɟɧɫɢɨɧɟɪ
ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ

ȿɫɥɢɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɬɜɟɬɢɥɱɬɨɨɧɪɚɛɨɱɢɣɢɥɢɫɥɭɠɚɳɢɣ ɨɬɜɟɬ ɬɨɡɚɞɚɣɬɟɜɨɩɪɨɫ
ɩɪɢɩɪɨɱɢɯɨɬɜɟɬɚɯɩɟɪɟɯɨɞɢɬɟɤɜɨɩɪɨɫɭ
23. ȼɵɪɚɛɨɬɚɟɬɟɜɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢɢɥɢɜɱɚɫɬɧɨɣɤɨɦɩɚɧɢɢ"
1. ɜɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢ
2. ɜɱɚɫɬɧɨɣɤɨɦɩɚɧɢɢ
3. ɡɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ
24. ȼɚɲɜɨɡɪɚɫɬ"
1. ɜɨɡɪɚɫɬ
2. ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ

ɥɟɬ

25. əɜɥɹɟɬɟɫɶɥɢɜɵɤɨɪɟɧɧɵɦɦɨɫɤɜɢɱɨɦ"
1. ɞɚ
2. ɧɟɬ
3. ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ
ɩɪɢɩɨɥɨɠɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɦɨɬɜɟɬɟɧɚɷɬɨɬɜɨɩɪɨɫ- ɤɨɧɟɰɢɧɬɟɪɜɶɸ
26. ȿɫɥɢɧɟɬɬɨɜɵɩɪɢɟɯɚɥɢɜɆɨɫɤɜɭ
1. ɢɡɞɪɭɝɨɝɨɝɨɪɨɞɚ
2. ɢɡɫɟɥɶɫɤɨɣɦɟɫɬɧɨɫɬɢ
3. ɢɡɞɪɭɝɨɣɫɬɪɚɧɵ
4. ɧɟɬɨɬɜɟɬɚ

30

ɉɨɥɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɚ
1. ɦɭɠɫɤɨɣ
2. ɠɟɧɫɤɢɣ
Ȼɨɥɶɲɨɟɫɩɚɫɢɛɨɡɚɜɚɲɭɩɨɦɨɳɶ
Ƚɨɜɨɪɢɥɥɢɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɫɢɧɨɫɬɪɚɧɧɵɦɚɤɰɟɧɬɨɦ"
1. Ⱦɚ
2. ɇɟɬ
3. Ɂɚɬɪɭɞɧɹɸɫɶɨɬɜɟɬɢɬɶ

business

percent working in a private

/ New York

origin: percent born in Moscow

age: % 55+

higher

education: % some college or

42%

44%

36%

66%

53%

Sex: % female

democracy

democracy

43%

63%

43%

76%

56%

300

markets and

markets and

301

telephone

New York 2015

telephone

sample size

questions about …

interview method

Moscow 2015

32

2%

64%

33%

49%

69%

137

markets

telephone

Moscow 1990

16%

38%

53%

504

democracy

face to face, in home

(GDT)

Moscow Oblast 1990

53%

66%

28%

63%

63%

120

markets

telephone

New York 1990

Table A1: Characteristics of the Five Surveys: Moscow, 1990 and 2015; Moscow Oblast, 1990; New York, 1990 and 2015.

